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We have long known about the substantial political role
played by American lawyers. Alexis de Tocqueville pointed it out
in the 1830's;' George Kennan complained about it in the
1950's.2 Political scientists have even attempted to quantify the
impact of lawyers' participation in politics,' while muckrakers
have been more inclined simply to assert such participation and
decry it.4 But we have had little scholarly attention directed to
the way in which the legal ideology of a lawyer-statesman shapes
his approach towards public issues. James T. Patterson's wellwritten and informative biography of Robert A. Taft, Mr. Republican, deserves special notice on this score, since he has marshalled the evidence needed for such an inquiry. Further, while
he does not argue the point directly, his interpretation of Taft
suggests that we cannot arrive at an adequate understanding of
Taft's political persuasion unless we appreciate the central importance of his conservative legalism.
Taft's legal ideology set him apart from other varieties of
conservatives. He shared little common ground with romantic
agrarians or nostalgic traditionalists. 5 Nor was Taft's conservatism rooted in a deeply religious sense of man's nature. In fact,
he took his religion rather lightly. Moreover, he compiled a
creditable record in favor of civil liberties which separated him
from the more authoritarian conservatives, and his aversion to
militarism was so strong that opposition to it constituted one of
the principal themes of his public life.6 Finally, in his primary
devotion to a conservative notion of the rule of law, he differed
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from those conservatives whose mission consisted almost wholly
of the straightforward defense of business interests. Robert
Taft's complaint about Henry F. Pringle's interpretation of William Howard Taft surely has application to any attempted account of his own political philosophy. "I do not think you
distinguish clearly enough," Taft wrote his father's biographer,
"between the attitude of mind which considers that the whole
future of civilization depends on the rule of law in an ordered
society, and one which sympathizes with the big bankers of Wall
7
Street and the reactionary heads of small industrial concerns.
The rule of law counted most heavily in Taftian conservatism.
Yet, if Taft's legalism gave a special flavor to his conservatism, his conservative allegiance kept him at odds with the
most innovative legal theories of his day. During much of Taft's
lifetime, a significant group of lawyers and legal scholars bent
their efforts to make law an instrument of reform. Taft's legal
ideology stood in opposition to theirs. His was not a sociological
or functional jurisprudence, and he would have none of that
deeper skepticism about legal decisionmaking which grew strong
in the 1920's and 30's under the banner of legal realism. Taft
characterized jurists like Thurman Arnold at "extremists. '8 It
might have been different, for young Bob Taft, first in the class
of 1913 at Harvard Law School, received an invitation to serve as
law clerk for Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. Had Taft become
Holmes' clerk, the venerable Justice, who believed the life of the
law had not been logic, but experience, might have provided an
alternative influence to the young man's father. As it was, on
advice from his father Taft declined the offer in favor of what
he found to be a boring law practice in Cincinatti.
The view of the law, therefore, that informed Taft's legal
ideology was the traditional one which he inherited from his
father. To Taft, the rule of law meant governing in accordance
with strongly held convictions, and, most especially, adherence to
three overarching principles: equal justice under law, equality of
opportunity, and human liberty. 9 It also meant careful attention
to the facts of concrete situations, and the logical application of
principle to those particular circumstances. More liberal jurists of
the time would have derisively labeled such an approach
"mechanical jurisprudence."' 0
The term had a measure of aptness in the celebrated instance in which the mature Taft gave direct expression to his
vision of the rule of law. At Kenyon College in 1946, he attacked
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the trials of Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg as contrary to "that
fundamental principle of American law that a man cannot be
tried under an ex post facto statute.""' Taft's contention rested
upon a strict reading of the major international treaties of the
interwar years. These treaties did not, of course, prescribe the
specific legal concepts and procedures which the Nuremberg
tribunal employed, and good reasons exist for requiring a high
degree of specificity as a precondition to invoking criminal
sanctions. But jurists who disagreed with Taft's position were not
disingenuous in arguing that these treaties had established a
duty to refrain from aggressive war with sufficient clarity that
Nazi officials could properly be tried for having violated a
preexisting obligation. In any event, Taft narrowed his objection.
He allowed that execution or incarceration of the Nazi officials
by court-martial would not trouble him on the policy ground
that, if free, they might start another war. Taft simply felt that
"the elaborate procedure of the Nuremberg trials" sullied the
judicial process by making it an instrument for carrying out "a
predetermined policy."'1 2 If Taft intended to suggest that the
guilt of the Nuremberg defendants was predetermined, he was
wrong. The Nuremberg tribunal handed down acquittals as well
as guilty verdicts, and it based the latter on the evidence presented to it. More likely, Taft meant that the policy of war
prevention was being effected through judicial means. In that
case his objection came down to a preference for extralegal
action with no procedural safeguards against arbitrary results, as
opposed to an attempt at some semblance of due process, which
ran the risk of discrediting the rule of law by not conforming to
the exact tenets of American jurisprudence. Still, the significance
of Taft's Kenyon College speech is not the relative merits of his
legal arguments and those of his critics, but rather the striking
illustration it provides of Taft's commitment to conservative
legalism.
Taft's legal ideology shaped his attitude towards international organizations in the postwar world. Although he voted for
the United Nations, he would have preferred a league of
sovereign nations based on law and justice. In contrast, Taft
pointed out, the U.N. had to rely on the good will of the great
powers. Taft wanted a statement of principles which a world
court would interpret in justiciable controversies. A nation that
refused to abide by this reign of international law would suffer
the opprobrium of world public opinion. Taft hoped that moral
force would secure obedience in most cases, but he was prepared
to see economic sanctions and military force employed if the
" PATTERSON 326.
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member nations, none of which would possess a veto, determined that such measures were necessary. To such an organization, Taft, who frequently sought to assure the United States a
free hand in its dealings with foreign nations, was willing to
surrender American sovereignty. 13 Patterson sees Taft's vision,
which bore a striking resemblance to that advanced by William
Howard Taft in 1918, as wholly inappropriate to the world of
1945.14 And so it would have been if Taft had insisted on
including the communist nations. But his advocacy of an international organization based on law and justice did not turn on
communist participation. If the communist nations refused to
join, Taft urged pressing on with the idea with whatever nations
would join. 1 5 Surely such an organization posed a feasible alternative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which Taft
ultimately opposed. Whether an organization of this type would
have moved the world closer to an international rule. of law by
the power of its example is open to question, but Taft's willingness to attempt it is not.
Conceivably, Taft's legalism contributed decisively to his
major legislative accomplishment. Patterson's account of the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act does not clearly resolve the question
of what Taft hoped the law would accomplish. At one point,
Patterson ascribes to Taft a desire to alter the "realities of
power"'16 in labor relations. It would indeed have been "the
ultimate irony of the struggle,' 1 7 as.Patterson notes, had Taft
succumbed to so instrumental a view of law that he expected to
alter power relationships in any substantial way through his
legislation. Taft's performance, however, comports more closely
with the contention that his objective was securing fairness, as he
understood it, rather than affecting power. Taft did, in 1946,
speak of the need to "redress somewhat the excessive power
given to the labor unions in collective bargaining, so that unreasonable men may not be tempted to abuse that excessive
power."' 8 But in the same year, Taft demonstrated that excessive
union power troubled him far less than disregard of those
principles he considered basic. Almost singlehandedly, Taft
thwarted Truman's near-successful attempt to win legislative
authority to draft strikers. The President's "most extreme" and
"unconstitutional" request, Taft declared, "violates every principle of American jurisprudence."' 9
Taft saw a disregard of these principles by the National
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Labor Relations Board as well, and it was this perception which
spurred his attack on the way in which the Wagner Act had
operated. The Board, Taft believed, had interpreted the Act as
favoring the organization of workers by industrial unions. Taft
wanted the government to play a more neutral role in labor
matters, and many of the changes made by Taft-Hartley in the
National Labor Relations Act reflected this desire. Thus, the
affirmation in section 7 of the right of employees to engage in
concerted activities for collective bargaining purposes was
amended to include an explicit statement that employees,
likewise, had a right to refrain from such activities. Further,
Taft-Hartley expanded the list of unfair labor practices in section 8 by outlawing union activities that interfered with section 7
rights. It left intact the Wagner Act's proscription of similar
practices by employers, although it did try to guarantee greater
freedom for employers to speak out against unions. Moreover,
both of the changes that seemed most clearly aimed at union
power-forbidding the closed shop as a matter of federal law
while permitting states to legislate against the union shop, and
making secondary boycotts illegal-could find strong, if not
persuasive, justification on fairness grounds. The closed shop did
compel support for the union from workers who opposed it, and
the secondary boycott inflicted economic harm, purposely and
directly, on those who were once removed from the primary
labor dispute. That contrary arguments can be advanced which,
for some of us, carry greater weight is beside the point, for the
issue is Taft's motivation, and in assessing that we must think in
terms of fairness as he understood it.
Taft's reactions to the House bill give further indication that
his conservative legalism determined the purpose he had for the
law. Expressing a belief that legislation should not range much
beyond the correction of clear abuses, Taft opposed governmental scrutiny of internal union affairs. Nor was he interested in
providing governmental authority to intervene in nationwide
strikes. The problem, he confided, had been overrated. He
preferred "to suffer the inconvenience of strikes than have a
completely government regulated economy." 20 And consistent
with his stand a year earlier, Taft remained adamant against
authorizing the President to seize plants when strikes created
national emergencies. Congress had time enough to act when a
particular situation arose, and, in Taft's opinion, it should
confine its action to the situation before it.
Thus far, we have examined specific instances in which
Taft's legal ideology contributed directly to positions he took on
20
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public issues. But his legalism had a more pervasive effect and
shaped his general approach to problems of state as well. We
have just noted his predilection for particular legislative action in
particular national emergencies created by strikes. Taft by no
means confined this preference to the labor relations field, for it
appeared in the realm of foreign affairs too. Patterson pays a
good deal of attention to Taft's foreign policy views, in part
because subsequent events have supplied a measure of vindication for attitudes that struck many at the time as simply
isolationist. Taft issued an early warning against the United
States assuming the role of international "knight-errant"' 2 1 and
22
he worried about the dangers of an American imperialism.
Patterson displays a certain fondness for pointing out that such
utterances by Taft accord well with the skepticism that emerged
in the late 1960's concerning the direction of United States
foreign policy. A rhetorical similarity undeniably exists, but the
bases of analysis employed by Taft and later critics differ. A
substantial part of Taft's hesitancy over such foreign entanglements as Lend-Lease, the Bretton Woods monetary arrangements, the loan to Great Britain in 1946, the Marshall Plan and
NATO reflected a caution rooted in his inclination to decide no
more than one case at a time and to limit the implications of each
decision as closely as possible to the facts of that case. Taft's
critique of increasing American commitments abroad, therefore,
pertained more to the manner and dimension than to the purpose.
Such a posture well suited Taft's penchant for statistics. He
was a veritable hound after facts, and this sometimes led him
away from his conservatism. The issue of federal aid to education furnishes a notable example. In 1943, Taft engineered the
defeat of the Thomas Bill by attaching an amendment which
barred racial discrimination in the use of federal aid, which
assured the defection of Southern Senators who had previously
supported the bill. Yet, even then, statistics demonstrating gross
inequalities in per-pupil spending for schools had caused him to
entertain some doubts about his opposition to federal aid for
education. The figures, after all, ran contrary to his belief in
equality of opportunity. By early 1945, Taft began working on a
bill that would guarantee in part through federal assistance some
minimum expenditure per pupil. The next year, he joined
Democratic Senators Elbert Thomas of Utah and Lister Hill of
Alabama as cosponsor of a federal-aid-to-educ;ition bill. The
National Education Association's lobbyist explained Taft's conversion process. Taft, he observed, "crammed his mind with
21Id.
22

200.

Id. 245, 291.

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

more facts than any man I've2 3ever seen. Before it was all over, he
was giving us the answers.
Taft's conservative legalism, expounded as it was with unquestionable intelligence, made him the most appealing political
leader of the American Right in his generation. But it likewise
made him obsolete, even within the Right itself. The presumptive heirs to Taft's mantle of conservative leadership took more
from the authoritarianism of McCarthy, the militarism of
MacArthur, and the parsimony of Byrd than from the legalism
of Taft. The Nixons, Knowlands and Goldwaters belonged to a
different generation of conservatives, whose habit of mind did
not include a central regard for the rule of law as Taft understood it. His was a conservatism appropriate to an age of reform.
He forged it in reaction to the New Deal's employment of state
power for progressive purposes. Through its insistence on a rule
of law in accordance with traditional principles, Taftian conservatism would have contained the reformist impulse, which required for its adequate implementation a more instrumental
jurisprudence that sanctioned a less principled use of state
power. The conservatism of the next generation marked the
beginnings of a renewed awareness that state power has an
important role to play in defending the status quo at home and
abroad.
Patterson is right, I think, in comparing Taft to Calhoun.24
Neither man was a cheap apologist for vested interest. Yet both
gave eloquent voice to a legalism particularly suited to a social
order that was passing. The order which Calhoun's legal principles protected was the slave plantation system of the Old South.
Taft's legal philosophy meshed best with the entrepreneurial
form of capitalism, which began to give way to corporate
capitalism at the outset of the twentieth century but survived
longest in the Middle and Mountain West. Taft's conservatism
represented the swan song of this old order.
23 Id. 324.
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This book provides the most systematic and articulate defense of the one-man-one-vote apportionment rationale. There
is a twofold objective: "to discuss the Supreme Court's conceptions of democracy and to determine whether . . . the Court
acted reasonably when it created new legal and political relationships in the aftermath of its apportionment decisions. Put
another way, the [book] attempt[s] to determine which of the
Court's opinions-majority, concurring, or dissenting-were
reasonable and which were not."'
Ball contends that the Warren majority fully appreciated the
democratic values at stake in the apportionment decisions, and
that to grasp adequately its treatment of those issues it is necessary to focus on the "normative" aspects of the Court's opinions.
Ball describes several facets of judicial policymaking and puts
forth criteria for examining and evaluating judicial opinions
generally. 3 But it is the "normative dimension" which is most
important to Ball because it "becomes the conceptual spectacles
through which the Court judges perceive reality (the empirical
dimension) and make their choices known (the legislative
dimension). '4 In brief, Ball seeks to demonstrate the continued
viability of theoretical analysis, though in fact his arguments
5
borrow from the "impact" perspective.
The introductory chapter is crucial. Here Ball sets out to
construct a reasonable paradigm of democracy. Such a
paradigm, he says,
should reflect the situational context, it should accept
the open-endedness of. the laws and the necessity of
changes due to past errors, it should aim for the alleviation of suffering and for the attainment of the good life
for all, it should stress the importance of good reasons,
and rest on due consideration shown all citizens. 6
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Ball's description of the characteristics of a democratic model
ultimately proves to be the linchpin of his reasoning. He de7
scribes democracy as "a democratically oriented social system"
with such mechanisms as majority rule and minority rights.
"Democracy," according to Ball, "'has little to say about the
substantive content of the economic or social theories that
prevail.' ",8 Democracy is justified since all men are equally ignorant; no one man or group can claim power on the basis of
possessing all political truth.9 Furthermore, argues Ball, "there is
no way to justify decisions made in the name of democracy which
deny a minority of

.

.

. citizens the right to vote, freedom of

speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press."' 0
Political equality is the foundation for the right to political
power," and to be democratic a political system must be
representative. 2 In a nutshell, Ball contends that a malappor3
tioned legislature cannot be democratic.'
The remainder of the book is devoted to a four-part analysis
of the major apportionment cases.' 4 First, the majority, concurring and dissenting opinions in each case are stripped to reveal
the attitudes of each justice on democracy and representation.
Second, the democratic model constructed by each of the justices
is compared with the "model" Ball constructed in the introduction. Third, Ball examines the adequacy of each justice's
definition of the conceptual issues, his "technical evaluation" of
those issues and the justifications put forth in defense of his
attitudes. Finally, there is an overall evaluation by Ball of the
"reasonableness" of each opinion.' 5
As noted, Ball's book is the most systematic and reasoned
defense of the one-man-one-vote apportionment rationale. Each
case is handled with skill and acumen, the author bringing his
model of democracy to bear with logical consistency and devastating effect. To say that much, however, is not to say that the
book is convincing. Nor is it necessary here to take a position
against the need for reapportionment, or to quibble with Ball on
relatively minor points. Once one accepts Ball's premises, his
arguments are irresistible. But why accept his premises? Normative political theory for Ball frankly amounts to nothing more
than positing the values he subscribes to, defining and analyzing
the apportionment problem in terms of those values and con7
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cluding with what was implicit in his introduction: that one man,
one vote is essential to a healthy democracy. Put another way,
Ball's introduction posits theoretical support-disguised as a
"model of democracy"-for values which lay at the foundation of
the Warren position. He then applies those theoretical criteria to
each of the justices' opinions to determine which justices put
forth positions most closely in tune with the "model" constructed
in the introduction. Those positions which square are labeled
reasonable and adequate, while those which do not are condemned as unreasonable and inadequate. The conclusions come
as no surprise.
To avoid such circular reasoning one must take issue with
the premises, namely elements of the posited model. Permit me
therefore to raise several objections of a general nature. First,
the characteristic features of Ball's paradigm of a reasonable
democracy are applicable not only to democracy, but to any form
of good government, whether it be democracy, aristocracy or
monarchy. Only perverted forms of government make other
than the public good the object of public policy. Second, for Ball,
as for most moderns, democracy is conceived of as the only
legitimate form of government.' 6 Instead of using the paradigm
concept, as it was used in classical theory,' 7 to express the best
regime under the best possible circumstances, Ball sees democracy as the only possible paradigm worthy of actualization under
any circumstances. Third, the reality of political existence becomes hidden under the mask of Ball's rational, almost
mathematical, democratic theory. Man is not only rational
but economic, emotional and spiritual as well. History reflects
these facets of politics. Ball does not. To use more precise
political theory terminology, Ball elevates "elemental" representation-governmental form-over
"existential" representa8
tion-governmental substance.'
To take another facet of the last point, Ball's model of
democracy is troubling because it is inconsistent. Ball seemingly
defines democracy as nothing but process. It is open-ended,
fallible, and contains no economic or social substance. Democracy means that anything goes. '19 Ball's model of democracy,
however, remains in fact anything but value neutral. Substance
slips in the back door under the guise of explicating the true
nature of a good democracy. The individual features need not
be repeated here. It is the standard "open society" model.20 Such
'6 See M.
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societies elevate toleration as their highest goal; no public truth
exists except the necessary belief that there is no public truth.
There is one exception; individual rights become the foundation
for all public policy. Rights only expand, never contract, and
there is no felt need to balance rights with duties. The cart, quite
consistently, is put before the horse. To ascertain the meaning of
specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, one no longer sifts them
through the constitutional text and historical experience. Instead, the Bill of Rights--even specific provisions-becomes the
medium through which the Constitution and democracy are
defined. Such a reading of the Constitution, as I have argued
elsewhere, 2 1 ultimately elevates not the people but the infallibility
of an "informed" and activist majority of the justices. Lucas v.
Colorado General Assembly2 2 is a prime example.
Finally, the success of Ball's thesis rests on a certain reductionism. Consistent with conceiving democracy as the only
legitimate form of government, for Ball, democracy is the sole
feature of the American constitutional framework. From the
inception of our nation, however, democracy was but one element, though a predominant one, of our constitutional
scheme.2 3 Rather than juggling the democratic, aristocratic and
monarchic features of our Constitution, Ball prefers the far
easier task of explicating democracy. Not only does Ball define
the American constitutional framework in such a way as to
eradicate nondemocratic features, but he condemns anyone who
does. 2 4 For Warren, and one suspects for Ball, "the choices
perceived were profoundly simple: either protecting constitutional rights or ignoring the appeals of... citizens who had been
denied those rights. 2 5
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